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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
performance may also result in reversal, for the right to have
appraisers receive all pertinent evidence offered is fundamental. 2
The instant case also held that the insured need not submit
to a new appraisal, for the defect in the award was due to no fault
of claimant, and in the absence of a showing of claimant's bad
faith, he may maintain a suit on the policy.a
Unearned Premiums
In Bohlinger v. Zanger, 4 the court encountered a problem
created by the statutory liquidation of an insurer while unearned
premiums were in the hands of a broker. The decision centered
on the definition of the broker's status when he accepts premium
payments from the insured; it was held that in so acting, the
broker is agent for the insured"5 and therefore need not remit the
unearned premiums to the appointed liquidator to await formal
distribution among the creditors, but may return them directly to
the insured.
The majority relied on the accepted practice among brokers
to refund unearned premiums to the insured upon cancellation of
the policy, where the broker has not yet made his remittance to the
insurer. The court could see no need for different treatment
where cancellation prior to the broker's remittance is accomplished
by a statutory liquidation of the insurer.
But the dissent pointed out that such a practice is largely
irrelevant, for it is essentially the product of bookkeeping convenience, and in the normal order of things, entails no legal
implications. But, it was argued, the situation is radically altered
when the cancellation results from insolvency of the insurer, for
the rights of other creditors must now be determined.
It is clear that for purposes of "placing risks or taking out
insurance" the broker acts as agent for the insured.3 8 But it does
not follow inexorably that he remains the agent of the insured
for purposes of accepting premium payments. Decisional law
has been uniform in treating the broker as agent for the insurer
32. Strome v. London Assur. Corp., supra note 26; De Groot v. Fulton Fire Ins.
Co., supra note 31. For a general discussion of the powers and duties of appraisers,
see 7 CoucH, op. cit., supra note 15, § 1576-1580.
33. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hefferlin, 260 Fed. 695 (9th Cir. 1919).
34. 306 N.Y. 228, 117 N.E. 2d 338 (1954).
35. INsuRANcE LAW §§ 111, 121, 125.

The latter section provides that an insur-

ance broker is "responsible in a fiduciary capacity for all funds received or collected."
The court found that in view of the statutory and common law principle that the broker,
when acting for the insured, is deemed the agent of the insured, § 125 must be construed
as creating a dual agency status: as trustee for the insured to return uneared premiums,
and as agent for the insurer to remit the earned portion.
36. INSURANcE LAW § 111.
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for delivery of the policy and collection of the initial premium,
from which has evolved the maxim that "payment to the broker is
payment to the insurer." 3 7 This thesis has been recognized andadopted in the statute as well."
Cases in other jurisdictions have held that this rule also
applies to situations where the insurer subsequently becomes insolvent,3 9 i. e., that the broker accepts premiums on behalf of the
insurer and must transmit them to the liquidator.
As the dissent herein indicates, if the rule that payment to
the broker is payment to the insurer applies in the absence of insolvency, no reason emerges why it should not apply in the instant case. The majority decision lends itself to the inequitable
result that those insured customers whose brokers, for any reason, have delayed in transmitting their accounts to the insurer
share in a special private liquidation, unconcerned with the rights
of other creditors, while an insured whose premium has been forwarded to the insurer must await a formal distribution by the
liquidator for refund of unearned premiums, subject to the interests of other creditors.
Finally, if the situation were reversed, and the brok~er were
insolvent, or if he were to convert the premiums to his own use
the rationale of the present decision would impel the result that
the loss be thrown on the insured. For if the broker is agent for
the insured, rather than for the insurer, for purposes of collecting
premiums, the loss is a matter of indifference to the insurer, which
may treat the policy as cancelled. It is doubtful that the court
would adhere to the implications of its present position in such
a case.

37. See, e.g., Minett v. Forester, 4 Taunt. 541, 128 Eng. Rep. 441 (1811) ; Mord
v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 245 N.Y. 279. 157 N.E. 138 (1927); Allen v.GermanAmerican Ins. Co., 123 N.Y. 6, 25 N.E. 309 (1890) ; 2 CoucH, op. cit., supra note 15,
1297, and cases dted therein; CoucH, INSURANCE LAW (1945 Cum. Supp.) vol. 1 at
486-487, n. 3.
38. IiqsuRANcE LAW § 121; Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Revision of
the Insurance Laws, N.Y. LEG. Doc., No. 101, p. 13 (1939); 1 PUBLIC HEARING OF
Thus,
JOINT ComMITTEE FOR REcoDnICATiON OF THE INSURANCE LAW, p. 161 (1937).
for the purpose of placing insurance the broker is agent of the insured, § 111; for delivery of the policy and collecting the premium, he is agent for the insurer, § 121 ; see,
e. g., Hermann v. NiagaraFire Ins. Co., 100 N.Y. 411, 3 N.E. 341 (1885).
39. Minett v. Forester, supra note 37; Goldschmidt v. Lyon, 4 Taunt. 534, 128
Eng. Rep. 438 (1812); Maloney v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 238, 251
P. 2d 1027 (1953). In the latter case it was clearly held that the broker was obliged
to remit to the statutory liquidator both earned and unearned premiums, the court
finding an actual agency status; Id. at 244-245, 247, 251 P. 2d at 1031-1032.

